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When is a report reliable?  We define the credibility of a report as a measure of how likely its appearance
would be if the reported fact were false.  Lots of false reports reach us every day, so, intuitively, for a
report  to  be  believable,  the  credibility  should be  high1.   McGrew  &  McGrew  (2009)  evaluates  the
resurrection report  r ,  establishing a high credibility,  leading to the conclusion that  r  (and thus the
resurrection, and thus the gospel message) is reliable.
This article fills two holes in the argument given there.
2  Prior probability
A general problem with Bayesian evaluations is the need for a prior probability.  We shall call the hartley
logit2 of the prior probability the prior.  Whereas for repeatable experiments  successful repetitions can
overcome any finite prior (Dawid 2018), with unrepeatable events any attempt to establish believability
can be frustrated if  an arbitrarily low prior may be chosen.  It is  therefore important to establish an
objective minimum for the prior for Jesus’ resurrection.
Here  it  is  important  to  establish  what  kind  of  arguments  do  not count  against  the  resurrection.   A
naturalist may claim that natural science has established some facts to such an extent that anything
countering such facts (and both parties agree that Jesus’ resurrection would probably counter them) has a
negligible prior.  That would be wrong, however, in the same way that a mathematical proof that 2+2=4
will not set the prior probability of one marble lacking from a bag in which twice two marbles had been
placed to zero: something not covered by the model behind the proof might have happened.
Likewise, something not covered by the naturalistic assumptions behind the scientific endeavour might
have happened – and that probability is what needs to be established.  The fact that we can, faithfully
repeatably, establish that no Big Bang takes place is no disproof of it having taken place in the past.
The main claim against the resurrection, is dead people don’t rise.  That claim is an inductive one, based
on a limited number of observations – taking the whole world population through the ages is certainly an
overestimation.  That population is thought to be in the order of 10¹¹, so an argument based on that could
never bring the prior below -11.
“But wait!”, one might object: the prior for someone rising might be that, but in all probability that person
would not have been Jesus.  Even given a resurrection, the prior for it being Jesus would again be 10⁻¹¹,
bringing the overall prior to 10⁻²².  But that objection commits the Texas sharpshooter fallacy: the claim is
that someone rose, and that person happened to be Jesus.  Admittedly there is a positive probability that,
given a resurrection, it was someone else who rose3 while not being reported, while Jesus was falsely (yet
so convincingly) reported to be risen, but that probability is surely way less than 1 – 10⁻¹¹.4
More importantly, it would defeat the induction that led to the prior of 10⁻¹¹ in the first place: if  of the
world population through the ages more people may have risen, that population may not be used to
establish the strength of the induction.  The very possibility that resurrection does not imply a report
drastically  reduces the base population for  the induction  to those people for  which a resurrection is
virtually impossible – i.e. that part of the modern world population whose dead bodies have recently been
correctly identified.  That number, even squared, will surely be considerably smaller than 10¹¹.
If we restrict ourselves to induction showing that people rising and convincingly reporting that fact is low,
we are back at our estimation of 10⁻¹¹, yielding a prior p(r)  of -11.
Let the  credibility c(d )  of a report  d  be the negative of the logit under the null hypothesis (i.e. the
hypothesis that the report is not founded in truth) of that report reaching us.  McGrew & McGrew establish
1 To be precise, the report should also not be unlikely under the alternative hypothesis.  We assume that here.
2 McGrew & McGrew uses probabilities, but using logits (log odds) makes the formulas simpler both in form and in
content.  For probabilities close to 0 or to 1, the hartley logit is very close to the Napier logarithm of the probability,
i.e. the exponent of the power of ten.
3 Which in itself would refute naturalism, making the truth of Christianity more likely.
4 For one thing,  it  is  lower than the probability  of a genuine resurrection report  being lost.   Depending on the
scenario (was it God who resurrected?  A statistical quantum fluke?) such being lost may have a low probability
itself.
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a credibility c(r )  for the resurrection report of 445, which together with the prior of -11 gives an intrinsic
believability b (r)≜ p(r)+c (r)  of 33.
3  Significance
It might seem that this high intrinsic believability would make the resurrection very likely.  That does not
follow, however.  The claim that God used a credible report of an a priori very unlikely event to prove the
truth of the gospel message defines a population  R  of possible highly intrinsically believable reports6
r i∈R  with ∀i:c(r i)≥c(r)  undergirding the gospel message.   Jesus’ resurrection is merely an after-the-fact
recognition of how God proved His Gospel claim – He could have used one of any number of such events,
and not taking that into account would be the base rate fallacy – after all, R  being large7, most of those
reports  would  be  false,  and  Bayesian  testing  can give  false  positives.   Given  |R|≫0 ,  ∀i:c(r i)≥c(r)
doesn’t imply c(R)≜c(∃i:r i)≫0 .  What we need is a low probability of any false report with a credibility of
at least 44 undergirding the gospel message occurring, i.e. a high c(R) .
The way we established the prior covers all reports in R  that include a resurrection, including e.g. reports
of other women finding the empty grave or Jesus appearing to the High Priest, but also John the Baptist
declaring himself the Son of God, dying and resurrecting or Jesus reappearing alive despite His dead body
having been eaten by dogs.  In fact, there is quite a bit of variation possible.  The Christ might have
appeared some generations earlier or later.  Instead of the Israelites, an Indian tribe might have received
what amounts m.m. to the Old Testament message, and the Saviour might have appeared there, with
credible reports of His death and resurrection.  Instead of appearing to His disciples after the resurrection,
He might have left a message in the sky.  As long as these variations include a resurrection, they are
covered by our established prior.  But what about possibilities other than a resurrection?  Presumably, God
could have used other ways to prove His point, such as Jesus not dying despite clearly being decapitated,
or His disciples obtaining the ability to visibly change bread and wine into flesh and blood.
All these potential reports r i∈R  that are at least as credible as the actual one r  form the (generalised)
tail of the probability distribution, and to claim significance for  r  it must be shown that  c(R)  is high.
But how to prove such a thing?  The world is such a rich and varied place, that computing the credibility of
the generalised tail R  seems impossible.
Fortunately, while the tail may be impossible to compute, it is still possible to bound it.  Let Q  be the set
of reports qi  with c(qi)≥c(r)  reporting any miracle whatsoever.   Clearly, |Q|≫|R| , and c(Q)≪c(R) .  And
P(false positive) ≤ P(R)=P(∃i:ri) ≪ P(∃i:qi) = P(Q ) .  Given the fact that we have no qi  other than r  at
all, with high probability P(Q)  is not high, and P(R)≪P(Q ) .
Even  if  we  allow  in  Q  all  sufficiently  credible  reports of  not-so-coherent  events  (e.g.  someone
prophesying his death in the next week, yet living for several centuries, or levitating), which would again
magnify the size by many orders of magnitude, still none has occurred.  This gives us a lower bound of
c(R)≥log(|Q|/|R|) .  It should be quite feasible to show this number to be at least 15 or so8.  If that can be
done, we may conclude that r  is reliable.
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